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Introduction 
Several groundwater experts have recently observed that groundwater in developing 
countries is by and large being left unmanaged (e.g. Katar Singh 1995; Van Steenbergen 
1997). They have repeatedly deplored the absence of effective regulatory mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, a consensus now seems to be growing that groundwater is too valuable to be 
left unmanaged ; law and administration are needed to preserve the quantity and quality of 
groundwater. Moreover, the feeling is that the inequity resulting from existing legal doctrine 
calls for better law (Moench 1995: p.1; Prasad and Sarkar 1994: p.153). There are various 
suggestions as to what kind of law and what kind of management system should be entrusted 
with these new tasks. 
Groundwater protection may or may not be a new issue, it is by no means the only subject 
that governments in developing countries try to administer and regulate properly, and then 
find themselves at a loss. In other words, many of the problems identified and the solutions 
suggested with regard to law and administration of groundwater in developing countries are 
not unique to that sector. They may occur in many other areas, from food distribution, building 
licences, to marriage law or land reform. The similarities of the administrative and legal 
aspects of those problems and solutions have even resulted in two fully-fledged fields of 
study: "development administration" and "law and development". 
Since the 1950s, "development administration" has gradually become a subdiscipline of 
public administration to describe and prescribe practices of public administration in the Third 
World. The core subjects of this subdiscipline include policy analysis, implementation, 
decentralisation, intermediate organisations and participation, institution-building, 
administrative culture, and corruption. Certain concepts and theories from this field may bear 
relevance to the questions addressed in this workshop. 
Even earlier than the 1950s, the role of law in Asia and Africa had become the subject of 
intense debate. Colonial scholarship had already acknowledged "customary law", "religious 
law", and many other "local normative systems" as "other conceptions of law". Yet, the 
colonial states and their successors - the states of the developing world - all established 
constitutions, laws and regulations, as well as ministries and local governments to enforce 
these laws and regulations, and courts for their interpretation in the settlement of conflicts. 
Since the 1960s, legal sciences have been enriched by what is known as "law and 
development" studies, in which the role of law and legal institutions in development 
processes have been critically assessed. Again, parts of this literature may be useful to the 
participants of this workshop. 
The organisers of this workshop have provided us with a two-fold question: What are the 
principles of proper management of groundwater reserves, and how can proper management 
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regimes be installed, given the conditions that prevail in many developing countries? I have 
been asked to comment on the legal and administrative conditions that prevail in developing 
countries, and to comment on various suggestions concerning groundwater law and 
administration. 
In my comments, I shall first take you to the field of "development administration" to see what 
it has to offer. This is, in the first place, the search for an appropriate role of the state amidst 
competing claims that market forces or local groups should be the prime movers of 
development. Besides development administration has much to say about institutional 
strengthening. We shall then make a brief tour around the field of "law and development". 
Since groundwater is a natural resource which needs protection, it is a concern of 
environmental law and management. Therefore, I shall make some comments on our 
experiences with environmental law and administration in developing countries, with some 
examples from field research in Indonesia. Then, lastly, I shall turn to groundwater law and 
administration, listing problems to be solved and then commenting on the legal and 
organisational measures that have been suggested to solve them. I shall respond to this 
workshop's question by suggesting a set of basic rules for proper groundwater legislation 
and organisational frameworks for groundwater management. 
1 
The role of the state 
Both law and public administration have always been closely associated with "states", and 
rightly so, I think . The problem, however, is that strong, effective, and law-abiding states are 
not the rule, as we have learned from practice and from studies. Literature on all sectors of 
development, including groundwater management, is filled with examples of laws and 
policies that have been badly implemented. This sad experience has actually affected the 
paradigms of development. In his book, Management Dimensions of Development, Milton 
Esman, one of the grand old men of development administration, described, how during the 
last decades, the naive, optimistic expectations of an almighty state that prevailed in the 
1960s shifted to new creeds according to which the state fails almost everywhere and in all 
areas (Esman 1991 : p. 1-1 9). 
Three competing paradigms : towards a pragmatic consensus 
Free-market ideologists, who believe in the "market", and workers at the grassroots, who 
believe in "local voluntary organisation", have united to this end. To my mind, there is a 
danger that the one naive belief - in the state - has been replaced by other naive beliefs. 
Esman has argued that these ideological stands - defending either state, market, or NGO as 
the prime mover of development - are rather one-sided. He has called for a pragmatic 
consensus to be reached in particular settings (Esman 1991). I fully agree with him on this 
point. Town planning, for example, should both learn from informal housing practices and 
build on market forces, but it should also remain an activity of government and regulation. 
My brief excursion through the literature on groundwater management, though, shows that, 
with some authors, the three paradigmatic positions are still popular. In a recent book about 
groundwater law in developing countries, which focused on Indian states with comparative 
excursions to China and the USA, this is clearly expressed (Moench 1995). Others advocate 
pragmatic, flexible arrangements in which state, market, and grassroots associations can all 
play their roles (Van Steenbergen 1997: p. 81). 
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The case of India 
The Indian case, which is described in the book by Moench (1995), is spectacular in that in 
1970 the federal government had already prepared a draft bill on groundwater, and 
suggested to the states that it be enacted. The states, being politically dominated by big 
landowners, gave no follow-up. In 1992, the consequences of a groundwater crisis having 
become more visible in many states, the central government presented a new bill. So far, only 
one state, Maharastra, has more or less enacted this legislation, while Gujarat has also 
passed some legislation. Moench's book, which is the only recent book on groundwater law in 
a developing country that I could lay my hands on, reflects discussions by Indians,'Chinese, 
and Americans about the bill and related issues. While all authors agree about the 
seriousness of the problem, they disagree about the strategies to be followed because they 
are generally tied up with one of the three paradigmatic positions. 
The Secretary of the Central Groundwater Board in New Delhi, Mr S.C. Sharma, pleads for 
government intervention by legislation to establish new groundwater authorities in each state 
with the power to issue and cancel permits for groundwater extraction (Sharma 1995). This 
approach of "direct state control" is shared by many others in the state apparatus 
(Chandrasekhar 1995). They actually call for water rights to be vested in the state. 
Marcus Moench, the book's editor, however, maintains that state regulation is probably not 
the optimum approach, because there is little hope of effective implementation. He considers 
the law-oriented "direct state control" approach too "insulated from local involvement" and 
suggests that it may well be obstructed by the wealthy, politically influential well-owners 
(Moench 1995(b): p. 39-41). In search of an alternative, he identifies an "overall tendency in 
current water resources management thinking" ..." towards greater participation", and he then 
calls for legislative structures to provide avenues for participation and local management 
(Moench 1995(b): p. 42). He meets with the approval of others, who suggest that indeed the 
problem can be solved by voluntary efforts by right-thinking persons (Srinivas 1995), with the 
help of a traditional culture of co-operation (Turnquist 1995), or through a new system of co- 
operative societies (Katar Singh 1995; cfr van Steenbergen and Oliemans 1997: p. 14). lt 
occurs to me that some of these authors are confusing "local" with "non-governmental" which 
might actually blur the real issues at stake. Anyway, Moench himself concludes also that fully 
decentralised approaches based for example on private ownership or village level groups, 
will not be sufficiently effective either (Moench 1995(a):p. 3). 
Later, Moench spots another "major trend in current water management thinking", which is 
"the potential use of economic levers and water markets".' Markets would facilitate private 
transactions, shifting water to higher-value/lower-volume use (Moench 1995(b): p. 44). Only 
potential negative effects - the author calls them "social and environmental externalities" - 
could then be addressed by direct state control and regulation. 
Looking then for what would, in the Indian case, constitute an optimum mix of legislation, 
voluntary initiatives, and market forces, some authors refer to American experience with law 
and administration, especially from semi-arid areas in the western states of the USA They 
suggest that this provides useful models and recipes (Katar Singh 1995: p. 73; Moench 
1995(b): p. 47; Thomas 1995; Turnquist 1995: p. 90). Only one of them, Chhatrapati Singh 
(1 995) explicitly raises the question "whether legislative approaches used overseas and by 
international conventions have any bearing upon the Indian situation, given the political, 
economic, and social set-up of India". I agree with this author that this question needs an 
answer based on research. In the meantime, I would suggest a cautious approach since this 
set-up in India and other developing countries is indeed quite different from that of the USA 
and other western countries. 
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Development administration 
"Administration", according to Herbert Simon, "is getting things done". In developing 
countries, the "thing to get done" is called development. This consists of a broad list of policy 
objectives. So development is an umbrella concept comprising, say, a dozen constituent 
processes, each of which refers to progress in a certain field. 
Development policy 
The processes of development concern nation-building, security, economic growth, social 
justice, education, health, environmental protection, democracy, authenticity, and, I would like 
to add here, good governance and legal certainty. Those are the goals of development, 
which, in most countries, are elaborated in sectoral state policies. The great development 
debates mainly deal with the interrelationships between these processes and, when their 
goals conflict, with which is the preferable one: security or democratisation, security or legal 
certainty, economic growth or environmental protection, economic growth or social justice, 
social justice or cultural authenticity? Such conflicts between different goals of development 
are at the bottom of most dilemmas of law and administration. Any sensible policy must be 
based on a careful balancing of interests and a deliberate preference for certain objectives 
over others. 
Groundwater management is no exception. The groundwater crisis, for example, raises 
issues of political stability and security, of economic growth, of environmental protection, of 
social justice, of public health, of good governance, and of legal certainty. They all contain 
wonderful development goals, but there are several conflicts and tensions between them. 
Strict environmental protection may, for example, decrease economic growth, antagonise big 
landowners, reduce legal certainty, thereby endangering stability and co-operation with good 
governance. 
In the words of groundwater management expert Smith (1995: p. 139): "There is no real 
correct answer to the question what is good groundwater management". I quote, "The answer 
depends upon what values a system seeks to maximise. One might as well ask: whose 
values?" (Smith 1995: p. 140) 
Institutions and policy implementation 
To get the formation and implementation of state policy actually done, administrators and civil 
servants operate organisations - big, medium, and small. Most of these institutions are 
oriented towards improving the condition of people (i.e. they are people-oriented).Each 
developmental goal, elaborated into sub-goals and tasks, has been entrusted to one of more 
of such institutions: security to police, education to schools, health to primary health units, 
agricultural growth to agricultural co-operatives. and rural banks, irrigation to water bureaux, 
and so on. New tasks have always led to the establishment of new institutions, which, in turn, 
have created the perennial and unavoidable problems of administrative co-ordination and 
competition. 
Those who advocate a greater role for local management organisations may well know that 
there are all kinds of local organisations. They include deconcentrated state offices, 
decentralised local government councils, co-operative associations, beneficiaries' councils, 
community development committees, traditional authorities (cfr. Uphoff and Esman 1974). 
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They all act locally. Using the term "local management" in contrast to "state management" 
would therefore create confusion. Another terminological issue is the use of "institution" as a 
broad term that includes: arrangements, associations, rules, regulations, and behavioural 
patterns (Schrevel 1997: p. 7, citing Coward). Personally, I prefer to use "institution" as an 
equivalent to "organisation", as most people do in development administration, rather than 
helping to introduce such confusing expert jargon. Actually, the general principle .of using 
clear terminology is always helpful, also in groundwater resource management. 
Development requires effective organisations that can turn tasks into results. Which factors 
determine whether such an organisation is effective in the sense that it can implement its 
tasks? There is a theory of three-fold support to implementation processes which I have 
derived from one of the theories of development administration that has survived the 1960s: 
the Institution-Building Model. On the basis of that theory, I submit that a successful 
implementation of tasks requires three-fold support: from the institution itself, from the target 
group, and from the wider context. The institution itself needs three things: resources, internal 
structure, and leadership. Whether the target group complies with the organisation's policy 
depends upon their interest, their access, as well as the reach and the possible use of force 
by the organisation. Social contexts include the social and cultural context, the economic and 
financial context, and the political context of both institution and target group. Although this 
theory was developed in the 1960s for state institutions, it can also be applied to semi-public 
or private organisations aimed at people-oriented development. 
Among the greatest threats to effective organisations are corruption and red tape - 
phenomena that one finds throughout society - in national governments, local governments, 
as well as in private associations. Each framework of policy, law, and organisation may 
sooner or later be confronted with the forces of corruption. It ought to be anticipated as much 
as possible. The fight against corruption should be an integrated part of any groundwater 
management effort as well as of its organisational design. 
Most articles on groundwater management touch upon some of the factors involved in 
research preceding implementation, but only partially. What we need is a number of regional 
case studies that systematically uncover three things. First, what happens inside groundwater 
institutions; which equipment, leadership, personnel, and behavioural changes would be 
needed for effective implementation of policy and law? Secondly, how do different types of 
water-users actually perceive their own groundwater practices and the upcoming crisis; how 
do they interact, communicate, relate to various types of local institutions, so as to find out 
what could really be expected from state intervention, self-organisation, or a mixture of both? 
Thirdly, how would the implementation of alternative groundwater policies be affected by the 
wider contexts, notably by political power structures (both centrally and locally), economic 
forces, and socio-cultural value systems? It is quite a job, but far from impossible. When 
foreign experts get involved in making policy recommendations and suggesting 
arrangements, preceding field research becomes mandatory. A good example is given by 
van Steenbergen's Ph.D. research, in which he presents three case studies in Baluchistan. 
Marked differences between the three areas are demonstrated, in the roles played by 
government institutions and local groups, by legislation and customary rules, and by the 
different target groups in those three areas. 
Decentralisation 
Because groundwater management is a new task for the state, and no precise division of 
tasks has yet been made between the levels of central, regional, and local government, much 
of the recent debates on management of groundwater resources focus on the issue of 
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decentralisation. According to Moench (1 995(a): p.1) the primary tension in India's growing 
debate on groundwater law, is "between those advocating centralised regulatory structures 
and those who view decentralised approaches as being both more implementable and 
equitable. World-wide, many people think highly of decentralisation because of its 
connotation with democracy. Nevertheless, departing from a simple slogan such as 
"decentralisation good, centralisation bad" would be a gross mistake. For decentralisation 
! can take on many forms (e.g. "democratic" devolution as well as "managerial" 
deconcentration). Some of these forms would clearly aggravate problems instead of solving 
them. 
In several parts of Africa and Asia, devolution in the health sector has already proved a 
disaster (Gilson 1994; Dreesens 1997) . In China, as we can also learn from Moench's book, 
rapid decentralisation of water management has not yet brought about the hoped for benefits. 
Anyhow, key functions of groundwater management (e.g. hydrological research and data 
I 
I 
analysis) should definitely remain with the central government. 
$ From studies in development administration, it has been learnt that no generalisations ought 
to be made on the relationship between decentralisation and development. It has rather been 
suggested that this relationship be deconstructed. First, it should be acknowledged that full 
decentralisation means the transfer of the four-fold set of tasks, resources, legal powers, and 
actual decision-making power. Quite often, only parts of this set are transferred. Besides, 
there are innumerable variations of decentralisation. 
Reflection on an appropriate arrangement in a particular case (e.g. groundwater 
management in a given country) requires pondering the following questions: Which goals of 
development are actually sought? Which degree of decentralisation would then be desirable? 
Should there be many tasks, powers, resources, or just a few? And which form of 
decentralisation would be most appropriate? For example, is it the British model of devolution 
in which private citizens have taken the initiative to pool their resources and rule their locality, 
or the French model of deconcentration in which central government has penetrated all lower 
levels of governments with appointed officials who administer local affairs (Alderfer 1960)? 
Which particular type of decisions should be transferred to lower levels: major policy 
decisions, minor executive decisions? 
To my great surprise, many authors overlook the fact that whether decentralisation is 
desirable or not depends on the capacities of the transferring level as compared with the 
capacities of the receiving level. The transfer of tasks from a well-run directorate of a national 
ministry to a provincial board, full of corrupt, unskilled officials without any resources, is 
doomed to fail. 
The endemic weakness of intermediate organisations 
It has often been assumed that "intermediate organisations" should emerge to link the values 
and structures of the state with those of the communities. Communities consist of strong 
informal networks of family members, friends, clans, caste associations, groups of believers , 
saving groups. They sometimes back parts of the state, parts of the markets, and even 
sometimes parts of NGOs. Many efforts have been made to organise those communities into 
some sort of local management organisation - from the famous Community Development in 
India since the 1950s to the co-operative movements. Most efforts have failed since 
intermediate organisations must lack a real power base. They fit neither into the local 
community structure nor into national states. In practice, either power holders from local 
communities took over, or the supervising government agency squashed the intermediate 
organisation to death. Yet many observers of groundwater problems support the need for 
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some form of "intermediate level institutional framework" linking both national levels to local 
levels and state to society (see Moench(l995a): p. 2). 
It is striking that, as late as in 1997, Indian authors again suggest that the co-operative model 
be followed. Katar Singh (1995: p. 76) suggests that "Landowners need to be organised into 
some sort of formal association under some law so that their activities are legitimised and 
their decisions legally backed up". He proposes that landowners be obliged to form co- 
operative water associations, which would make and enforce all necessary rules on 
pumpage, pricing, and the sale of water. He then wants to vest the landowners' water rights in 
the co-operative associations. The rights could be sold on lease to individuals for a certain 
period. The associations would pay a fee to the government. The farmers would buy shares 
in the association. All wells should be transferred to the association. The society should then 
auction to its members the right to use tubewells for irrigation or to sell water. "We know", 
writes Katar Singh, "that it is a novel idea beset with numerous legal, financial, operational, 
and managerial difficulties in its implementation. But the serious consequences of not doing 
anything warrant immediate action." (Katar Singh 1995). 
Actually, the idea is not at all new, and we have learned from many instances that it did not 
work. Co-operatives are much too often hothouse plants in the cold - intermediate 
organisations with goals that are displaced by the goals of private or state actors. 
All these failures do not wash away the need for governments and NGOs to communicate 
intensively with the target groups about policy and about the organisational forms to be 
chosen. In India's recent groundwater bill it is proposed that each state establishes 
groundwater boards. Representation of water users would be one way to establish a 
mechanism for consultation. People who may be affected by state intervention, ought to be 
consulted about their experiences, ideas and preferences. Representation in a regional board 
is not sufficient though. Hearings in rural areas should also be convened to listen to other 
voices as well as to explain the background of the state's groundwater management. 
Law and development 
Legal certainty 
One of the dimensions of development is the increase in legal certainty This requires good 
legislation, lawful administration, and independent judicial decision-making. In most 
developing countries, much progress has yet to be made in these three areas. Legislation 
has frequently been inconsistent, unrealistic, and inaccessible. Administration has been 
plagued by unrealistic planning, lack of skills and resources, sloppy registration, bad 
communication, lowmorale, corruption, and a marked lack of attention to legal aspects. 
Judiciaries have been much less independent and also less professional than constitutions 
suggest. 
Thus, in the average developing country, there is no properly functioning legal system; it is 
rather, as an Asian colleague once put it, a system in-the-making. So, on the one hand, 
nobody would deny that law is relevant and indispensable in managing a country; on the 
other hand, most insiders know that in practice the legal system does not work properly. 
The need for inside knowledge of the law means that, when designing legal policy 
instruments, one should keep in mind that, although one should respect the law, in practice 
one cannot fully rely on its enforcement. Yet before adding new elements, one has to know 
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the legal system. In the first place, this will guarantee that new legislation is consistent with 
the basic legislation already in place. In the second place, in a given country, some parts of 
the legal and administrative system may do better than others (e.g. tax administration may be 
much more efficient than land registration, courts may act more efficiently and independently 
in criminal law cases than in administrative law cases, or provincial governments may have 
better law-making skills than local governments). Such inside knowledge of legal systems is 
vital in drafting new regulations. More than once, however, drafters in developing countries 
adopt regulations from other legal systems or from international treaties. 
Law fam i I ies 
When studying the use of legal transplants into a foreign legal system, jurists generally follow 
the path carved out by their colleagues of comparative law, like the famous René David from 
France or Konrad Zweigert from Germany. From them, we have learnt that the world has a 
few major legal systems that have more or less spread over the world: common law, 
continental law, socialist law, and a group of "other conceptions of law". The assumption is 
that the legal systems of most countries, including developing countries, are essentially 
based on, or are at least closely related to, these mother systems, which mainly originate 
from Great Britain and the United States, as far as common law is concerned, from France 
and Germany for the continental law, and from the Soviet Union for the socialist law. The 
"other conceptions of law" include major, well developed, religious normative systems, such 
as Islamic law and Hindu law, as well as customary law, which is essentially unwritten and 
local. 
Common Law or the Anglo-American group of legal systems is widespread throughout 
former parts of the British Empire in Asia and Africa, North America, Australia, and, of course, 
Great Britain itself. This law is basically judge-made law rather than being laid down in 
comprehensive laws and codes. It requires a strong and independent judiciary, but leaves it 
to individual citizens to call upon a court, except in criminal cases. Much of the available 
groundwater management literature is written in English and refers to certain problems with 
the "common law". Indian experts complain that British Common Law has left them with a 
rights structure that allows no legal limits to groundwater extraction by individual landowners 
(Moench 1995(a): p. 1). 
Continental Law or the Roman-German group is widespread throughout those parts of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin-America that once formed part of the other colonial powers such as France, 
Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Belgium, and also in some countries 
that were not colonised such as Japan, China, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The law here 
is basically made by legislators. Major examples are the Napoleonic codes dating from 
approximately 1800, and, later, some German codes. Recently, the new Dutch civil code has 
served as a model in many parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. So, the 
continental system requires strong, highly skilled legislators. While private property and 
freedom of contract belong to its core elements, it also embodies a strong bureaucratic 
tradition in which the administration actually allocates rights to citizens by granting or 
cancelling a permit or licence. 
Socialist law also used to be a major family before the collapse of the communist empire in 
1989. It originates from the continental law, but key elements such as private property and 
freedom of contract have been replaced by socialist notions. For natural resources, this 
doctrine would focus on their social function and on the sovereign rights of the people as 
embodied in public ownership of land, water, and forests. 
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There can be no doubt that, of old, customary and religious rules on groundwater have 
developed in those areas that experienced a practical need for it. From a historical 
perspective, religious rules, notably Islamic rules, can essentially be considered a 
continuation, or reform, of local custom in certain areas of the Middle East during the early 
Middle Ages. Such rules are therefore often too limited in scope to function as an 
autonomous basis for new groundwater management. On the other hand, insofar as they 
have an appeal with local populations because of their practical and or symbolic value, an 
effort should be made to incorporate such rules in emerging legal regimes. An authoritative 
book on water laws in Muslim countries was written in the 1950s by the Italian lawyer Dante 
Caponera, and it was recently revised. It shows that the Islam contains certain provisions 
regarding water, some of which regard restrictions on water use. One example is the 
bordering land of a well, the so-called harim, on which it is forbidden to dig a new well so as 
not to affect the quality or the quantity of existing wells. Another example is the Islamic rule 
that water should be the common entitlement of all Muslims and that it is forbidden to sell it 
(Caponera 1954: p. 17). Brief recapitulations of the water laws of Muslim countries can also 
be found in Chandrasekhar (1995: p. 20-21) , while Van Steenbergen (1997) demonstrates 
how the harim rules have successfully been applied in Baluchistan. 
1 
Legal pluralism 
During the 1970s and 1980s western academic studies of laws in developing countries have 
been dominated by the paradigm of legal pluralism, as it was developed in legal 
anthropology. The monopoly of the state in law-making was rejected, and rules produced by 
any kind of ethnic, social, or functional group were labelled as "law". The theoretical and 
political underpinning of this trend can be traced back to colonial days, when local customs 
were called adat law (adat is the Bahasa Indonesia term for custom) , folk law, or customary 
law in order to justify the recognition and application of local, social rules of the people, not 
only by indigenous courts but also by colonial state courts. For some time after 
independence, many countries maintained the idea that their legal system, or considerable 
parts of it, could be founded on customary law or religious law. In most fields of law, this idea 
has faded with time. In some fields, however, notably in family law and a few parts of land law 
and criminal law, this idea has been pursued by incorporating religious and customary rules 
in the state's legal system. 
After the rapid social and economic changes of the last decades, I think we should be 
hesitant to give general legal recognition to "folk-law" systems as such. I rather believe that 
legislators, judges, and legal scholars should consider, case by case, to what extent elements 
of local culture, such as customary rules, deserve recognition as law. 
Law-making in developing countries 
Against this comparative and historical background, we must realise that the making of 
effective law in developing countries is not an easy job. If a country belongs to the continental 
tradition (e.g. Indonesia or Brazil), it may face other legal problems than countries bound to 
the common law doctrine (e.g. Pakistan or Tanzania). Yet, in matters of land and water in 
Indonesia or Ghana, customary law may still play a more significant role than religious law, 
whereas in Pakistan, being an Islamic state, religious law is important. In both Tanzania and 
Indonesia, the socialist imprints on natural-resources law are still visible, but all countries 
have subscribed to international treaties that are often framed in the English language, 
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smuggling in all kinds of concepts that have developed in common-law countries. So, from a 
purely technical viewpoint, coherent law-making is already quite a challenge. 
At the same time, apart from technical considerations, the law-makers are caught up in 
several fields of tension. Firstly, should they follow trends set by international bodies or 
western countries, or should they come up with something clearly national and authentic, 
something visibly Pakistani, Indonesian, or Egyptian? Secondly, should they give in to ethnic 
pressure from fundamentalist parties by stressing and strengthening the old rules derived 
from Hinduism, Islam, or the culture of Zulus or Zapatics? Thirdly, in many law-making 
processes, there is still the tension between state-led socialism and market-led capitalism, 
the latter having lately been strongly promoted in the Third World by donor countries and 
institutions since Reagan and Thatcher decided in the 1980s that that was better for their own 
countries. Fourthly, there is the tension between authoritarian, centralist approaches and 
democratic, decentralised approaches, again the latter being happily promoted by donors, 
since we have found that decentralisation and democracy work rather well in the west. In the 
fifth and last place, there is severe tension between the rule of law as the supreme standard 
of all human action, and the actual normative standards - or the lack of them - in the daily 
processes of informal, and often illegal, fixing and wangling that play such dominant roles in 
the lives of the people in developing countries. In discussing useful laws and other policy 
instruments, we should beware of those fields of tension, and try to help in finding a proper, 
stable position in their midst. 
How developing countries have coped with such complexities and tensions of law in 
development can be illustrated with many examples. Since our main concern is with the 
management of natural resources, in particular of groundwater, I shall now give some 
attention to the relevant fields of law and policy, being the environmental management and 
the environmental law of developing countries. 
The development of environmental management and law 
A new legal-institutional infrastructure 
Over the last decades, most developing countries have established a body of policies and 
regulations to protect natural resources. Since the UN Conference on the Environment in 
1972 in Stockholm, these countries have ratified many environmental treaties (Otto 1991). At 
present, most countries have their environmental management act, their ministry of public 
authority ‘for environmental protection, their sectoral plans and regulations and licensing 
systems concerning nuisance, water pollution, industrial pollution, air pollution, as well as the 
protection of soils, forests and other nature reserves, and their flora and fauna. In many 
countries, efforts are underway to set up environmental management offices at regional and 
local levels. 
Often, the present environmental legislation is already supposed to provide some broad 
protection to groundwater, but it seems that the time has now come to regulate groundwater 
protection more explicitly and more precisely. A few years ago, a UNESCO study group 
suggested that indeed groundwater protection law should be seen as a new branch of 
environmental law. What would that mean? 
The objectives of creating a branch of the law are usually two-fold. Firstly, certain policy 
objectives are deemed desirable, and secondly, it is intended to create legal certainty in a 
particular area of human action. Legal certainty is one of the major goals of any legal system. 
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In any given area, the degree of legal certainty basically depends on three conditions: firstly, 
on the prevalence of legislation that is recognisable and consistent; secondly, on the 
prevalence of state institutions that themselves comply with those rules and induce private 
citizens to do the same; and last but not least, the prevalence of effective judicial remedies in 
cases of non-compliance. In short, all three parts of the trias politica need to be in good 
shape; otherwise legal certainty will suffer. 
How is the condition with regard to environmental law (Otto 1996: p. 33)? Several studies on 
the environmental laws of Indonesia and India give us the following indications and 
hypotheses as points of departure (Otto 1991 ; Munneke and Otto 1990). For the following 
sections, I have drawn quite heavily on our research in Indonesia, but I have few reasons to 
assume that the condition of environmental law in other developing countries will be either 
much stronger or much weaker. 
Environmental legislation 
During the 1980s, considerable progress was made in environmental policy-making and 
legislation. International principles of environmental policy law, formulated by the Grundland 
Commission and by commissions of legal experts, have found expression in national policies, 
programmes, and laws. Environmental law became an important subject, also in developing 
countries: it was included in the curricula of law faculties, in the practice of business firms and 
legal consultants, in the extension programmes of NGOs, and in international development 
co-operation programmes. 
Legislation often seems to be fairly coherent and more accessible than the laws in many 
other fields. Yet, three legislative bottlenecks must be mentioned. Firstly, many legislative 
provisions are still very broad and ambiguous, so they badly need implementing regulations, 
which have often been delayed. Secondly, eclectic absorption of legal concepts from different 
legal systems has sometimes led to confusion (e.g. the connection between new permit 
systems for, say, the control of water pollution, with existing nuisance permit systems; or the 
transplantation of the North American concept of environmental impact assessment, which 
seemed at one point not to fit in with the existing Continental-Dutch system based on laws 
and licensing). Such misfits have led to many calls for the co-ordination or harmonisation of 
environmental law. Thirdly, environmental law is in many instances connected to, and even 
dependent on, other fields of law. In order to have a polluter sentenced according to criminal 
law, courts will have to rely on the existing criminal law and criminal procedure law, especially 
the law of evidence. In order to accept claims from environmental pressure groups, the courts 
must conform to the law of civil procedure. If the law is not clear on these points, all depends 
on an administrative and judicial interpretation. 
Environmental administration 
In the administration of environmental protection, four major challenges have posed 
themselves: policy co-ordination, beefing up central organisation, decentralisation, and 
administrative culture. Most of these issues have already been dealt with in a general sense 
in section 2, "Development Administration". 
Although the concept of sustainable development has found its way into five-year plans and 
other policy documents, the ministries that are primarily geared towards economic growth 
(e.g. agriculture, industry, public works, transport) simply outweigh a ministry of the 
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environment, and dominate national policy-making. Yet, to fulfil its mission, this ministry must 
try to influence decision-making processes in these often hostile ministries. This requires a 
strong homebase and highly skilled officials and strong political backing from the top. In 
Indonesia there even is no full-fledged ministry for the environment since the government is 
of the opinion that a lighter co-ordination mechanism is better equipped to deal with the other 
ministries. On the other hand, a central agency was established after the model of the 
American Environmental Protection Agency. 
But even with hard bureaucratic infighting and many resources, it has proved to be very 
difficult to build a strong central institution for environmental management in times when 
economic growth is limited or even absent and when governments are supposed to shrink 
rather than expand. Moreover, provincial and local governments are seldom strong partners 
in environmental management. Local entrepreneurs and other economic interest groups will 
often be able to put more pressure on them than NGOs can do. Don't forget that the role of 
the local press, the natural partner of environmental NGOs, is still often curtailed so that it 
cannot reveal environmental scandals to the public. 
Changing administrative culture remains difficult but is a conditio sine qua non. Corrupt 
practices are part and parcel of environmental administration. All sorts of do's and don'ts are 
circumvented: licenses are bought, officials are bribed, and honest leadership to control the 
controllers is in short supply. These, briefly, are some basic problems of environmental 
administration, which may also apply to groundwater management. 
Environment in the courts 
It is before the courts that weaknesses in the legislation become fully exposed, but there are 
other problems as well. In environmental cases, courts in developing countries are 
confronted with the following challenges: access, innovation, unity, and dissemination (Otto 
1996: p 51 -58) 
Access is a problem because victims of pollution, often poor people, seldom have the 
financial means, administrative skills, and mental state needed to start a court case against a 
company. They are therefore dependent on institutions that perform social litigation on their 
behalf. At least in Indonesia, recent case law on locus standi of such environmental NGOs 
has already improved access. 
As regards innovation, impartiality, and judicial activism, some countries clearly have a better 
reputation than others: India, Egypt, and Ghana can be considered more developed than, 
say, Indonesia or China (Tiruchelvam 1983; Otto 1995; Pompe 1996). Indeed, available 
literature on South Asia suggests that court cases sometimes play a role. In Van 
Steenbergen's Baluchistan cases, though, it seemed a venue to protract old enmities rather 
than a way to resolve groundwater dispute. One of the dangers of adapting American legal 
models is that it is precisely the American systems that have powerful, independent and 
innovative judges, who make big landholders, and even governments, obey their indictments 
while conditions outside the western world are so different. 
Unity in judicial decision-making is another problem in many developing countries, where 
Supreme Courts have backlogs that count into the thousands, so that it will take many years 
before firm case law can be established at the highest level. 
In the meantime, in many countries, the dissemination of the decisions of lower courts 
remains troublesome so that they are not always exposed to public and academic scrutiny, or 
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even to other courts. The registration and smooth communication of court decisions would, of 
course, be in the interest of parties - including NGOs, police, and prosecutors - to obtain 
points of reference in preparing new cases. 
When we study the environmental law in developing countries, we find many such conditions. 
The situation may not be very encouraging for drafters of new groundwater legislation. 
Understandably, many observers have been attracted to management systems that are less 
oriented towards law and administration such as common property resources management. 
However, it is not self-evident that has 
demonstrated to this workshop, it can only work if it is easy for resource users to co-ordinate 
their actions. If they cannot, the state and the market are better alternatives. Probably, one 
has to be prepared for a reality in which none of the alternative systems can be very effective. 
But if the goal is making effective legislation one should be realistic and face the gloomy 
realities of legal process, unfair markets and quarrelling local groups rather than play to the 
gallery. 
this can provide a way out. As Nibbering 
Groundwater law and administration 
The problems 
According to the literature, there are at least five main groundwater problems to be solved: 
1. The danger of exhaustion of groundwater reserves, now or in the future; 
2. Falling watertables causing harvest losses, rising costs of pumping, and land subsidence; 
3. Tail-end deprivation; 
4. Salinisation due to rising watertables; 
5. Loss of usability due to pollution. 
The first three problems call for a reduction in groundwater extraction; the fourth problem 
calls for a carefully balanced combination of pumping, irrigation, and drainage; the fifth 
problem calls for the control of water pollution. In this section, I shall focus on the three 
related problems and, at the end, shall briefly comment on the other two. It is important to 
note here that, in practice, these problems do not have to occur simultaneously or at the 
same place. This calls for a differentiated, adaptable management regime. 
Basic rules and institutions for groundwater control 
At the moment in many developing countries, land owners drill and'pump as they like 
(Moench 1995: p. 50), and there is a growing consensus that this must be stopped. But how? . 
After the above account of the conditions of law and administration in developing countries - 
especially in environmental management - the questions remain: what amount and what type 
of law are needed, what kind of institutional framework is needed, and which solutions are 
needed in case specific legal and administrative bottlenecks occur? 
Let me first sketch some very rough outlines, which can be elaborated in greater detail later. 
On the basis of the literature that I have gone through, I suggest that there are a few basic 
rules and a few basic institutions that together constitute the heart of a groundwater 
management system, and about which a general consensus has grown (Chandrasekhar 
1995~22-23). 
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1. There must be a legal limit to the freedom of landowners to drill and pump as they like; 
2. There must be a Lower Groundwater Institution (LGI) at a regional or local level; 
3. The LGI must register all wells and users in its area; 
4. The LGI must regulate and re-allocate rights to drill and use groundwater, either through a 
licensing system or otherwise. 
5. The LGI must conduct direct monitoring and supervision; 
6. There must be a Higher (national or provincial) Groundwater Institution (HGI); 
7. The HGI has the task and powers to collect and analyse hydrological data on 
groundwater; 
8. The HGI also has the task and powers to make a classification of areas according to the 
urgency of groundwater problems and the specific management regime needed; 
9. The HGI has the task and powers to co-ordinate its policy with other higher government 
institutions; 
1 O. The HGI has the task and powers to oversee groundwater management at a higher level. 
My impression is that these basic rules reflect a general consensus among most 
governments and experts. Yet, there are two serious problems surrounding these rules. 
The first problem concerns the composition of the Lower Groundwater Institution that is 
needed, and the type of rules it will make and/or enforce. To arrive at an optimum 
arrangement, the factors mentioned in the previous sections should be thoroughly analysed. 
The second problem is simply that there will be widespread 'resistance from landowners 
against limitations imposed on their freedom. Their opposition will, of course, focus on rules 
and institutions that regulate and reallocate the unlimited groundwater rights that have been 
so much in their interest. To achieve their political and economic goals, they will also use 
legal and administrative arguments, which we shall discuss below. 
What kind of lower groundwater institution? 
Generally speaking, there are three basic models for Lower Groundwater Institutions: a 
government office, a people's group, or a mixed government-people's institution. The first two 
correspond with two of the three paradigms that were discussed in the introduction of this 
paper: state and local groups. 
Certainly, each model has its pros and cons, and different conditions in different countries call 
for different models. Two books, one by Van Steenbergen (1997) and the other by Moench 
(1995), give us helpful information: Van Steenbergen especially by his empirical case 
materials, and Moench because he gives us so many different approaches, some of them 
based on doubtful argumentation. 
Let us take a look at the three case studies from Baluchistan by Van Steenbergen (1997). In 
Kuchlak, the people's group of "kareze" management collapsed; the people's group 
managing collective dug wells collapsed as well. Finally, on the basis of new legislation, a set 
of decisions by the Provincial Water Board settling water disputes brought some control, 
albeit rather limited. 
In Mastung, a people's group of tribal elders made serious efforts to control all water users, 
but their influence on new dug-well developers was too limited and disputes continued until 
the government, the local administration, took the initiative to gather the group of elders and, 
together with them, to establish rules. A supervising organisation was created consisting of 
three elders to issue permits and safeguard the rules. The elders found little time to attend to 
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their duties, however, so this people's group also collapsed. Gradually, responsibilities shifted 
to the government. 
In Panjgur, a highly dispersed and informal people's group of "kareze" shareholders is in 
power. They control the area and intimidate potential dug-well developers to protect their 
"kareze". If their intimidation has no effect, the government will usually back them and decide 
the case. 
Summarising, people's groups often play a role, but they have a tendency to collapse. 
Government officers have an important role to play as conflict settlers and as partners in rule- 
making and rule-enforcement. No mixed institutions were created. 
t 
The USA provides some examples of highly sophisticated people's groups. As the scarcity of 
groundwater became acute and conflicts arose, farmers and other water appropriators - in 
response to court orders and after long deliberations - created water districts and established 
water users' associations to regulate pumping and impose other constraints (Katar Singh 
The participants pooled money, technical information, agreed to have voluntary cutbacks of 
25-30%, and each year reported their withdrawals. The associations hired staff (i.e. water 
masters) for the monitoring and sanctioning. 
1995: p. 75-76). 
According to Katar Singh, "lndia.could learn many lessons from this experience and design a 
similar strategy (see section 3, on intermediate organisations). A plea for immediate action 
deserves our support, but is this the right direction? Surprisingly enough, the same author, 
Katar Singh, in the same article, describes an experimental project, supported by Norway 
from 1974 until 1987, with joint ownership of tubewells by small farmers, but which did not 
succeed because of intra-group conflicts, a weak position vis-a-vis competing tubewells . 
(private and public), an inability of the group to frame appropriate rules, a lack of participation 
of members in decision-making, and an inadequate power supply. 
Essentially similar reasons led to the collapse of agricultural co-operatives in many 
developing countries. Van Steenbergen's cases from Kuchlak and Mastung follow the same 
direction. 
Katar Singh (1 995: p. 97, footnote 18) also warns against pseudo-co-operative societies, and 
this warning should be taken seriously. In developing countries, it is highly probable that a co- 
operative society will develop either into a cover-organisation of the local strongmen or into a 
local extension of the central government. One can easily agree with Katar Singh's thesis 
that, for the success of any group endeavour in natural resources management, the rules for 
equitable sharing must be framed and enforced ruthlessly by the group (Katar Singh 1995: p. 
77), but it must also be acknowledged that empirical evidence suggests that this seldom 
occurs. 
Active government intervention seems indispensable. The next question then becomes: 
should such intervention be undertaken by a deconcentrated, sectoral off ice for water 
management or by the local administration? My suggestion would be to create regional water 
boards, chaired by the chief of a province or district, but technically supervised and supported 
by one of the water management ministries or the ministry of the environment. 
Members of such water boards should include expert officials and regional leaders, 
representing the values and interests of the people. The representation of people in such 
boards helps to establish the principle of consultation. People whose fate will be affected by 
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state intervention should be consulted to hear their experiences, ideas, and preferences. 
However, representation in a regional board is not enough. Regular meetings in rural areas 
should be convened to listen to other voices as well, and to explain the background of 
groundwater management. 
Legal bottlenecks? 
Basic Rule 1 suggests that there be legal limits to the freedom of landowners to use and sell 
the groundwater they extract from underneath their land. Much of the literature on India 
suggests that, in common-law countries like India, such limits would be against the law. 
It is suggested that there are four legal doctrines in common law, none of which allows for 
state control. I do not agree with that suggestion. Indeed, the oldest common law doctrine is 
the riparian doctrine or absolute ownership doctrine, which scarcely limits the rights of 
landowners to extract groundwater; implicitly, their share is absolute (Katar Singh 1995: p. 
75). This doctrine, however, has been supplemented by the doctrine of reasonable use. 
According to this, groundwater rights are limited to "reasonable use" on overlying land. A third 
doctrine goes one step further: the doctrine of correlative rights that has been developed in 
the United States. It says that, in times of scarcity, the court, if called upon, would permit the 
overlying owners, as correlative or co-equal owner, to have access to their proportionate 
share. So the court, if called upon, would limit the rights to "proportionate share with 
reasonable use". As these doctrines all attribute rights to landowners, one may ask what 
would be the rights of tenants and landless labour, especially when they have had access to 
groundwater in the past. Coming to their rescue, common law jurists have developed a fourth 
principle: the doctrine of prior appropriation. It states that first water rights are vested in those 
who were first in time, regardless of land ownership (Turnquist: p. 88 , footnote 26). 
From this account, we can learn two things. In the first place, even in common law doctrine, 
limits have already been set according to reasonable use and proportionate share. But in the 
second place, the control according to common law rests in the hands of citizens who call 
upon courts to make decisions with new rules that are obeyed. The latter condition would 
seldom work in developing countries because of access problems and problems with 
efficiency and impartiality on the side of the courts (see section 5, "Environment in the 
cou rtsl') . 
One may then ask with what right can the government itself set up a control and licensing 
system to stop landowners from using groundwater, which they regard as their private 
property, and, in this respect, whether the legal conditions differ between common law 
countries and continental law countries. 
The new Dutch Civil Code, which can be considered the most modern civil code in 
continental law countries, holds a pleasant surprise. It states in Book 5, Section 3, on 
"Property of Immovables", that the property of land includes, unless the law states otherwise, 
the groundwater that has come to the surface by a source, well, or pump. The legislator 
assumes that groundwater is res nullius (nobody's thing) until it has been brought' to the 
surface (Stolker 1994: p. 31 1). In other words, until it is pumped up to the surface, it is no 
one's property. Whether a landowner is allowed to extract it, and how, and in which quantity, 
can certainly be decided by administrative law. Moreover, the groundwater will become the 
landowner's property "unless the law states otherwise". So, in this continental code, I can see 
no legal problem in groundwater control. 
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I have tried to find out what common law doctrine has to say about this matter. It is clear that 
under common law groundwater cab also become the landowner's property through 
accession. It is also evident that environmental law can put limits to an owner's use of his 
property. But I have no decisive information on whether groundwater is a res nullius, before it 
is pumped up. Anyway, I would not be surprised if this whole argument that has developed in 
India would be very weak from a legal point of view, and not more than a quasi-legal cover for 
strong economic and political interests. Further study, however, is needed to sound this out. 
Since law in developing countries is often ineffective anyhow, some observers turn to 
religious or customary rules. It is easy to suggest that local water-use rights are equitable and 
should therefore be backed and legitimised by state law (Katar Singh 1995: p. 78). I do not 
believe that this can be a panacea, as I explained above when I referred to legal pluralism 
(section 4). 
When problems become urgent, rules must be clear and, if necessary, enforceable in the end 
by state authorities. This calls for legislation, rather than mere reference to traditional rules. 
Having said this, I hasten to add that legislation can be national, regional, or local, that 
legislation should be simple, and, inasmuch as possible, should reflect the values and norms 
of the communities addressed. The rules framed by local administration, together with tribal 
elders in Baluchistan, could therefore have taken the shape of a regional regulation, 
enforceable before the courts, and thus adding to legal certainty in groundwater 
management. I 
Conclusion 
It has often been proposed that local groups should be involved in groundwater management 
and that legislation should conform to local ideas. One must agree. that terms like 
participation, local management, local acceptance, legal pluralism and decentralisation have 
a pleasant ring. However, in some areas landowners must really be stopped from pumping as 
they like , against their will but for the sake of other people and future generations. Here the 
need arises for strict administration and law enforcement with strong backing of a central 
government. If there is no political will or administrative capacity to do so, escalation into an 
armed conflict should not come as a surprise. 
This article suggests that state intervention for groundwater management is a must. Political 
agenda-building to make protection of groundwater resources a priority issue is badly 
needed. The question of decentralisation should be addressed systematically. 
Implementation problems are to be anticipated by focusing on institutions, target groups as 
well as social contexts. The internal structure of local groundwater institutions should 
minimise opportunities for corruption. In order to build strong institutions, mechanisms must 
be developed for consultation with targets groups of local users. In this respect self- 
organisation by local groups ought to be welcomed but not imposed. 
Any groundwater law aims at an increase of legal certainty in its field. However, general 
conditions in most developing countries are such that one cannot rely on the effectiveness of 
a legal system. Yet one should make the best of it and therefore try to understand the roots 
and the structure of the national legal system concerned. New groundwater legislation needs 
to be brought in harmony with existing environmental law and other relevant legislation. Thus, 
legal models for groundwater control from other countries should not simply be transplanted. 
Whether indigenous rules of religious or traditional origin should be incorporated ought to be 
decided on a case to case basis. It is for sure, though, that , whether in common law, civil law 
or indigenous law, water rights based on landownership must be limited. 
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Before governments can control groundwater resources research should be carried out not 
only in hydrology but also in the socio-economics of groundwater users and use as well as in 
development administration and law. Such research should aim at finding pragmatic 
solutions enabling state, market and local groups to contribute to good groundwater 
management (Moench 1995(b): p. 47). The basic rules developed in this article can serve as 
a point of departure. 
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